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boycotts which lie outside those limits. If we assume 8(b) -
(4) (A) was intended to disapprove a result as well as
proscribe an act, it would be illogical to indorse the result
simply because it was accomplished by other methods or
the forbidden means were employed at an earlier point in
time. From a practical standpoint, if the employer is in-
duced by a threat of, or by an actual, work stoppage to
agree to a hot cargo clause, the very intent of 8(b) (4) (A)
is violated even though the boycott itself does not occur
until later. The particular means used to enforce the clause
would be, under this view, irrelevant except to the extent
that the direct approach to the employees of a neutral is
singled out for special censure as an unfair labor practice.
The concentration by the Court in Sand Door upon the
literal words of section 8 (b) (4) (A), which ignores the evil
Congress undoubtedly intended to eliminate - the widen-
ing of the area of a particular labor dispute - does not
advance the cause of industrial peace. While courts, as they
often piously declare, should not legislate, they should
however (and in fact often do) analyze the legislative pur-
pose behind the language of a statute and construe the
words in the light of that purpose.
CHARLES P. LOGAN, JR.*
Wife Cannot 'Sue Husband At Law For Tort
Against Her Property Interests
Fernandez v. Fernandez'
Plaintiff-appellant brought suit against her husband,
from whom she was living apart, in replevin to recover
certain of her chattels and damages for their detention. The
husband demurred to the declaration on the ground that a
wife could not sue her husband at law for the return of
property. The demurrer was sustained on that ground.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County,
the case was remanded for further proceedings without
affirmance or reversal.2
The appellant contended on appeal that the Maryland
rule against a wife's suing her husband at law for personal
injuries should not be extended to a case involving property
interests and cited authority from other jurisdictions in
* Member of Maryland Bar; LL.B. 1958, University of Maryland School
of Law.
1214 Md. 519, 135 A. 2d 886 (1957).
'Under MD. RULE 871 (a), allowing such procedure when the interests
of Justice can best be served thereby.
FERNANDEZ v. FERNANDEZ
accord with this contention. Although the Court of Appeals
recognized "that the authorities generally hold as she con-
tends",' the Married Women's Property Act in this state
has been so construed as to prevent the following of the
appellant's contention without reversing prior decisions
of this Court.'
One of the earlier Maryland cases construing the Act
was the case of Furstenburg v. Furstenburg,5 which in-
volved an action by a wife against her husband for per-
sonal injuries received in an automobile accident. The
Court of Appeals construed the Code provision in regards
to this type of suit to do no more than allow a wife to
maintain a suit in her own name and without joining her
husband against a third person. The statute, being in
derogation of the common law, was narrowly construed; at
common law this type of suit was not allowed and since
the statute does not specifically authorize it, a wife can-
not sue her husband in tort for personal injuries. In arriv-
ing at this conclusion, the Court was aided in their reason-
ing by Article 45, Section 20,1 which was passed two years
after Section 5, and which specifically authorized a wife
to make a contract with her husband and to sue him on
that contract. The specific authorization of a suit on a con-
tract between husband and wife carries the implication that
Article 45, Section 5, was not intended to authorize a wife
to sue her husband. Otherwise, Article 45, Section 20, would
be superfluous.
Five years after the Furstenburg case, the case of
David v. David' was decided. There a wife brought suit
for personal injuries against her husband and his co-partner
Supra, n. 1, 521.
Ibid.:
"The cases in Maryland have interpreted the act with such strictness
and have given it such limited effect that we find ourselves unable to
follow the authorities elsewhere without overruling our prior decisions,
despite the appeal to reason and convenience that the rule urged
upon us has."
5152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927).
64 MD. CODH (1957), Art. 45, Sec. 5:
"Married women shall have power to engage in any business, and to
contract, whether engaged In business or not, and to sue upon their
contracts, and also to sue for the recovery, security or protection of
their property, and for torts committed against them, as fully as if
they were unmarried: .... 1"
'4 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 45, Sec. 20:
"A married woman may contract with her husband and may form a
co-partnership with her husband or with any other person or persons
in the same manner as if she were a feme sole, and upon all such con-
tracts, partnership or otherwise, a married woman may sue and be
sued as fully as if she were a feme sole."
8161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755, 81 A. L. R. 1100 (1932), noted 1 MD. L. Rv.
65 (1936).
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but was unsuccessful. Relying on the Furstenburg case and
reasoning that each partner was severally liable for the
negligent acts of the partnership, the Court concluded that
a wife could not sue a partnership of which her husband
was a member for injuries received as a result of the negli-
gence of the partnership. The reasoning of the Court
dealt with the presumed legal identity of husband and wife
which could only be destroyed by express legislative decla-
ration and,
".. . upon the broader sociological and political
ground that it would introduce into the home, the basic
unit of organized society, discord, suspicion and dis-
trust, and would be inconsistent with the common
welfare."9
With particular reference to this preceding quotation, it is
interesting to note another statement by the Court in the
same opinion:
"Practically, the married woman has remedy
enough. The criminal courts are open to her. She has
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if unlawfully
restrained. As a last resort, if need be, she can prose-
cute at her husband's expense a suit for divorce."'10
Although these remedies, at least the criminal remedies,
are less likely to be resorted to, one may well ask if they
are any the less detrimental to the harmony of the family
than a personal injury suit would be, and in particular, a
divorce proceeding which completely destroys the family
relationship. Of course, marital discord will usually be
present before any of the aforementioned remedies are
resorted to, and will normally be present before a wife
files suit against her husband in any court. There are ex-
ceptions to this, however, such as suits to try title to land
or where the primary consideration is collecting on an
insurance policy, but in such cases marital discord could
hardly be said to be a usual forerunner. Where insurance
is involved, the insurance company which insured against
tort liability should be held liable as in any case involving
a third person, and, though there might seem to be a greater
danger of fraud on the insurer, this is probably no greater
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These two cases were followed by Riegger v. Brewing
Company" wherein a wife was denied a cause of action
against her husband's employer for injuries sustained by
her as a result of the husband's negligence while acting
within the scope of his employment. The court pointed out
that if the employer was held liable, he would have a cause
of action over against the husband, the actual wrongdoer.
The preceding cases represent the principal develop-
ment in the construction of this aspect of the Married
Women's Act, and were the cases which the Court of
Appeals felt bound them in the principal case. However,
each dealt with a personal injury as opposed to a tort
against property interests. This is the first case to go to the
Court of Appeals wherein a wife brought suit against her
husband, at law, for an injury to her property interests. 2
The right of a wife to sue in equity for the protection of
her property has been recognized and accepted in Mary-
land.'8 In Cochrane v. Cochrane,4 wherein a wife filed
a bill of complaint against her husband for an accounting,
discovery and property in the hands of the husband belong-
ing to the wife, the Court of Appeals said:
"It has long been settled, in this State, that the
relation of debtor and creditor may exist between hus-
band and wife, and as, under the Code, the wife is
vested with the legal title to her separate estate, she
can maintain an action for the recovery, security or
protection of her property. ...
"In Wilson v. Wilson, 86 Md. 638, decided on Janu-
ary 5th, 1898, it was said that the weight of authority
seems to be that either the husband or wife can sue
178 Md. 518, 16 A. 2d 99, 131 A. L. R. 307 (1940). The more recent case
of Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 87 A. 2d 581 (1952), which denied a wife
the right to recover from her husband sums expended by her for necessaries
during separation, called the grounds for denying the action artificial,
especially when discord had already entered into the home, but the Court
considered itself bound by the prior decisions, much the same as in the
principal case.
U Cf.: Barton v. Barton, 32 Md. 214 (1870) and Odend'hal v. Devlin, 48
Md. 439 (1878), both of which are proceedings at law. In the first case a
widow was allowed to maintain an action against the executor of her
deceased husband for, among other things, the value of securities forming
part of her separate estate, and in the second a creditor of the wife (even
though a creditor normally steps into the shoes of his debtor) was allowed
to garnish part of her separate estate in the hands of the husband. It would
have been just as easy in the second case to find the promotion of marital
discord as it was in the principal case.
' "The jurisdiction of equity to enforce an accounting between husband
and wife, or to appoint a receiver, has been recognized in many cases".
Smith v. Smith, 211 Md. 366, 369, 127 A. 2d 374 (1956), involving a bill of
complaint filed by an estranged wife against her husband for an accounting
and the sale of real estate, etc.
. 139 Md. 530, 115 A. 811 (1921).
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the other in equity for protection of his or her
property."' 5
The Cochrane case contains a dictum based on its in-
terpretation of Article 45, Section 5, that the suit could also
be brought at law. 6 This was erroneously cited as a hold-
ing in 1 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW 65, which fact was pointed
out by Judge Hammond in the principal case, though he re-
fused to follow the dictum.
As evidenced by the much cited case of Masterman v.
Masterman" equity will protect even the interest of one
spouse in property held by the spouses as tenants by the
entireties from harmful action by the other spouse. The
case, though before the Court on demurrer, recognized the
right of a wife to compel her estranged husband to apply
his portion of the proceeds of an insurance policy to the
restoration of the property.
Is there any reason for this distinction between a suit
by one spouse against the other spouse in equity and at
law? To the layman, a suit is a suit, and the effect is the
same whether brought at law or in equity. As was previ-
ously pointed out, the remedies suggested by the David8
case are, at best, a last resort and very unsatisfactory. With
reference to the marital discord element, it is possible for
the equity courts to cause more discord than the law courts
in that equity, where the suit must be brought, can enforce
its decree by imprisonment of the defendant's person.
Without arguing further against the inconsistency of the
Maryland position, let it suffice to say that currently in
Maryland a wife may not sue her husband at law for a
tort to her property interests. Such suit must be brought
in equity.'" Nor is Maryland alone in this position.2"
In marked contrast to the Maryland position, the Dis-
trict of Columbia in Notes v. Snyder,2 decided under a
-Ibid., 532.
Supra, n. 14, 534.
"129 Md. 167, 98 A. 537 ( 916).
'Text, circa., ns. 8-10. 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755, 81 A. L. R. 1100 (1932),
noted 1 MD. L. REV. 65 (1936).
"The trial court noted specifically that his decision was without
prejudice to the right of appellant to bring a new proceeding in equity
but we see no reason why the case should not have been transferred
from the law to the equity side of the Circuit Court In which It was
brought and appropriate amendments to the pleadings permitted.
Maryland Rule 515." Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 524, 135 A.
2d 886 (1957).
0 See Heckman v. Heckman, 215 Pa. 203, 64 A. 425 (1906); Smith v.
Smith, 4 N. J. Misc. 596, 133 A. 860 (1926) ; Anthony v. Anthony, 135 Me.
54, 188 A. 724 (1937); and Easterly v. Wildman, 87 Fla. 73, 99 So. 359
(1924).
214 F. 2d 426 (D. C. App., 1925).
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statute almost identical with Article 45, Section 5, though
without the added influence of Article 45, Section 20, said,
"[w]e are of the opinion that either spouse may prosecute
an action in replevin against the other in the Courts of the
District".22 The Court reasoned that the Married Women's
Property Act gave the wife a separate estate and the right
to sue separately. "There is no public policy which would
forbid the bringing of such actions, whereas the right to
bring them is necessary to carry out the plain intent of
the enabling law."28 However, a right of recovery is de-
pendent upon proof of a right to the immediate and ex-
clusive possession of the property at the time of the com-
mencement of the action, and because of that requirement,
plaintiff failed as the property was owned jointly. Again
in contrast to the Maryland position, the District in the
above case was careful to distinguish the Notes case from
cases involving personal injuries. The public policy aspects
were considered to be much different.
Much support can be found for the District view both
in case law24 and among the text writers.25
- Ibid., 426.
Ibid., 427.
21 See Walker v. Walker, 215 Ky. 154, 284 S. W. 1042 (1926), an action of
forcible detainer; Cook v. Cook, 125 Ala. 583, 27 So. 918 (1900), ejectment
from separate estate; Hedlund v. Hedlund, 87 Col. 607, 290 P. 285 (1930),
suit to recover specific chattels (see also Rains v. Rains, 97 Col. 19, 46
P. 2d 740 (1935), wherein a wife was allowed to maintain an action for
personal injuries against her husband) ; Eshom v. Eshom, 18 Ariz. 170, 157
P. 974 (1916), trover; McDuff v. McDuff, 45 Cal. App. 53, 187 P. 37 (1919),
ejectment; Buckingham v. Buckingham, 81 Mich. 89, 45 N. W. 504 (1890),
ejectment; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 154 Mich. 100, 117 N. W. 598 (1908),
trover; Gillespie v. Gillespie, 64 Minn. 381, 67 N. W. 206 (1896), decided
under a statute giving the wife the same rights as her husband has; Hartz
v. Hartz, 13 Ga. App. 401, 79 S. E. 230 (1913), trover; Eddleman v. Eddie-
man, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S. E. 833, 836, 109 A. L. R. 877 (1937), trover by hus-
band, wherein the court said:
"While the statutes of this state, . . . do not purport to change the
common law in respect to personal torts committed by one spouse
against the other, they do change the common law in respect to property
rights of the wife. With respect to such rights she is a feme sole, and
may be sued by her husband in a bail-trover proceeding for recovery of
his personal pr6perty converted by her."
Bennett v. Bennett, 37 W. Va. 396, 16 S. E. 638 (1892), stating that while
a wife cannot sue her husband at law, the husband can confess judgment
in favor of the wife and it will be valid unless set aside for fraud; Edmonds
v. Edmonds, 139 Va. 652, 124 S. E. 415 (1924), unlawful detainer ; Madget v.
Madget, 85 Ohio App. 18, 87 N. E. 2d 918 (1949), suit for declaratory judg-
ment of rights in proceeds of insurance check; Crater v. Crater, 118 Ind.
521, 21 N. E. 290 (1889), ejectment, but note statutory authorization;
Bruner v. Hart, 178 Okla. 222, 62 P. 2d 513 (1936), dictum to effect that
wife can sue husband in replevin but goods found not to be part of her
separate estate. See also annotations in 109 A. L. R. 882 and 41 A. L. R. 1054.
2 PRossEa, ToxiS (2nd Ed., 1955), §101.
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"Since the primary object of these statutes was
to free the wife from the husband's control of her
property, the courts have generally agreed that they
enable her to maintain an action against him for any
tort against her property interests. Thus she may re-
cover from him for conversion or detention ....
Likewise, since the statutes destroy the unity of the
persons and place them upon an equality, it is held
that the husband may recover from the wife for simi-
lar torts as to his property."26
In nearly every case allowing one spouse to sue the other for
a tort to property interests, marital discord has been
present, and in many of the cases it has been stated as a
prerequisite to bringing the action. In the principal case it
was present and it seems very doubtful that the case would
have ever come to trial had it not been present.
In conclusion, the Maryland position seems unneces-
sarily restrictive. It is based primarily on cases involving
personal injury torts and upon an interpretation of the
Married Women's Property Act which is very limited and
narrow. The principal case was an ideal case for reaching
an opposite result. The Court itself considered it appeal-
ing from the appellant's viewpoint, which was supported
by the dictum in the Cochrane case, as well as the weight of
authority in other jurisdictions. However, the Court saw fit
to saddle itself with this narrow interpretation of the
statutes and is now truly bound by stare decisis. The
remedy lies with the Legislature.
J. PAUL ROGERS
Implied Warranties In The Sale Of Realty
Gilbert Construction Co. v. Gross'
Defendant, a developer, entered into a contract of sale
with Plaintiffs providing for the sale of unimproved lease-
hold property, and for the construction of houses on the
properties by defendant in accord with plans and specifi-
cations attached to the contract prior to conveyance of
title. The specifications called for the construction and
installation of the exact make of pipeless furnaces actually
installed. Plaintiffs sued for an alleged breach of warranty,
showing that the furnaces were unsuitable for the houses,
Op. cit. ibid., 672.
1212 Md. 402, 129 A. 2d 518 (1957).
